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COMMENTS
THE DOCTRINE OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY:
RULE OR EXCEPTION?
There is hardly another question in the law of torts that has produced
as many conflicting answers by courts and legal writers as that of the
parental immunity from an action by the child for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of the parent.' One of the reasons for this conflict
is the fact that the answers are frequently based on emotions and beliefs,
and depend upon the writers' 2 personal convictions as to the rights and
obligations growing out of the family relationship.
ORIGIN AND EARLY APPLICATIONS OF THE IMMUNITY RULE
Another reason for the contradictions found in the case law is the
obscurity as to the origin and history of the immunity doctrine, and
there is disagreement as to its first pronouncement. Older decisions held
that at early common law a child was without remedy for a personal
tort committed by a parent,3 while more recent cases deny that such a
general rule existed.4 The first group of decisions find the existence of pa-
rental immunity by an analogy to the common law forbidding all suits be-
tween husband and wife. But they overlook the fact that the marriage re-
lationship was created by the consent of the parties with the result that in
the eyes of the law husband and wife became one person, and Married
Women's Acts were necessary to change the status of the woman to a
separate legal entity. The child-parent relationship, however, is created
by natural kinship, and there was never any concept of "legal unity"
between parent and child. 5 In fact, there is agreement that the child
could always maintain an action against the parent based on injuries to
his property rights, while the wife could not do so at common law.
Once the fundamental difference between the two relationships is recog-
nized, the law applying to the one cannot be invoked to govern the other.
Whatever the early common-law rule might have been-there are no
English cases to support either theory6-there is agreement that the first
1 PROSSER, TORTS 670 (2d ed. 1955).
2 McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HAuv. L Rxv. 1030
(1930).
3 Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111
Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
4 E.g., Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950). Consult also 34 Cm.-
KENT L. REv. 335 n. 8.
5 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 675. 6 McCurdy, supra note 2, at 1060.
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judicial declaration of the parental immunity rule in the United States
is found in Hewellette v. George,7 a Mississippi case decided in 1891
which, without citing any authority, held that where a mother had her
unemancipated minor child wrongfully committed to an insane asylum,
the child could not maintain an action for false imprisonment against
the mother. The court recognized that the child had sustained actual
damages, but denied recovery since the injuries were inflicted by the
plaintiff's parent. The reason given in this holding-that "the peace of
society... and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the. repose of
families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a
right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress' 8-has
remained the principal rationale of later decisions which have applied
the immunity doctrine. The strict adherence to this rule led to decisions
which completely nullified its very purpose by protecting even a parent
who had disrupted the family peace by brutality,9 or by rape of his
daughter'0 and who, upon action by the injured child, used the immunity
rule to shield his guilt, contending that such a demand for compensation
might create strife in the family. The obvious absurdity of this reasoning
led the courts to find exceptions and distinctions which permitted a
deviation from the general immunity doctrine in particular situations.
DEVELOPMENT OF EXCEPTIONS
Although there is no clear line of demarcation as to the facts which
will- sway a court to permit a minor child to- recover a judgment-against
his parent for personal injuries inflicted upon the child, there appear
two extreme situations in which the courts seem to agree. First, no
present-day court would apply the strict immunity doctrine in favor of
a parent who was found guilty of intentional, criminal conduct." Sec-
ondly, there is agreement that a parent will not be subjected to an action
in tort where he acted within his parental authority and control. The
privilege of the parent to use reasonable force in restraining his child is
based upon our concept of the family unit as the nucleus of our society
in which the parent is entrusted with the child's upbringing and educa-
7 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). (Frequently cited as Hewlett v. George.)
8 Id. at 705, 9 So. at 887.
9 McKelve' v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
10 Roller v. Roller, 37 W.Vash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
11 .\Iahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A. 2d 923 (1951). In fact, courts have held that
the Hewellette case which promulgated the rule and applied it to protect a parent who
had committed the intentional tort of false imprisonment was incorrectly decided.
Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950) is an example of such holdings.
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don; he must, therefore, be authorized to discipline the child where
necessary. 12
Except for the two extreme situations discussed above, there is great
conflict as to the applicability of the immunity rule in cases where the
child was injured by activity of the parent which falls outside the scope
of typical parental acts but does not reach the other extreme of criminal
conduct. Recognition of the injustice resulting from a strict adherence
to the doctrine should have led the courts to a re-evaluation of the entire
field of parental immunity, which originated with a much criticized case
decided nearly seventy years ago, when the concept still prevailed that
the parent was the autocratic head of the family who "could do no
wrong."'13 But instead of re-examining the validity of the doctrine in the
light of changed conditions of the present day, many courts do lip-
service to it, while at the same time creating inroads which they deem
necessary to protect the child's interest in compensation for a wrong
inflicted. There is an ever increasing number of cases which refuse to
grant immunity to a parent where special circumstances are present.
What these circumstances are is the object of the following discussion,
and an attempt at classification will be made.
DENIAL OF IMMUNITY
A. Malicious Torts
In Cowgill v. Boock,14 a father forced his minor child to ride in an
automobile which he was driving while drunk, and then caused a collision
in which the child was injured. The Oregon Supreme Court granted re-
covery to the child on the basis that it was absurd to talk about pre-
serving the family peace where the peace was already completely dis-
rupted by the father's malicious acts. The father, in stepping outside the
bonds of the family relationship was no longer protected by a rule cre-
ated to prevent strife and litigation based on injuries inflicted "while
the parent was discharging his duties as parent."' 5
B. Wanton and Wilful Misconduct
The Illinois Supreme Court approved of the reasoning in the Cowgill
case, and went one step further by granting damages to a child for in-
12 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P. 2d 218 (1955). Consult PROSSER, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 113.
13 "Today we are not generally afraid of the idea that everybod)r is governed by law
in all his relations. In this age it can hardly be necessary or even desirable that the child
be reared in the atmosphere of one under the control of an absolute tyrant." Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 363, 150 Atl. 905, 910 (1930).
14 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950).
5 Id. at 301,218 P. 2d at 453.
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juries caused by the father's wilful and wanton misconduct in the op-
eration of an automobile in which both were riding. In the case of Nudd
v. Matsoukas'6 the Illinois court joined the modern trend by abandoning
the strict adherence to the parental immunity doctrine which it had
followed for twenty-three years. In reliance upon the authority of the
Mississippi case of Hewellette v. George,17 the Illinois Appellate Court
had first enunciated the doctrine in 1895 in the case of Foley v. Foley,x8
and had reaffirmed it in Meece v. Holland Furnace Co.19 in 1933. But in
Nudd v. Matsoukas20 the Illinois Supreme Court held the reasoning of
these decisions insufficient to preclude an examination into the basic pol-
icy question involved; nor did the doctrine of stare decisis prevent such
re-examination "when doubts are raised in the minds of the court as to
the correctness of [prior decisions]. ' '21 Without abrogating the immunity
doctrine altogether, the Illinois court refused to apply it under the par-
ticular circumstances, emphasizing the wantonness and wilfulness of the
parent's acts, which deprived him of the "mantle of non-liability." In the
words of the court: "To tolerate such misconduct and deprive a child
of relief will not foster family unity but will deprive a person of redress,
without any corresponding social benefit .... -22
C. Ordinary Negligence
While in the Nudd case the Illinois court found the wanton and wilful
misconduct of the father destructive of the parental immunity, a recent
Missouri case granted recovery where the child's injury was caused by the
parent's simple negligence. In Brennecke v. Kilpatrick23 the action grew
out of an automobile collision resulting in the mother-driver's instant
death and the child-passenger's injuries. There was no allegation of wan-
ton or wilful misconduct on the part of the driver in the operation of the
automobile, but the court found that the death of the parent distinguished
this case from an earlier Missouri decision,24 where recovery by the child
for injuries caused by mere negligence of the father-driver was denied.
After restating its adherence to the general rule that an unemancipated
167 111. 2d 608, 131 N.E. 2d 525 (1956).
17 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
18 61 111. App. 577 (1895).
19 269 111 App. 164 (1933).
20 7 I11. 2d 608, 131 N.E. 2d 525 (1956).
21.Id. at 615, 131 N.E. 2d at 529.
221d. at 619, 131 N.E. 2d at 531.
23 336 S.W. 2d 68 (Mo. 1960).
24 Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W. 2d 29 (1953).
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minor child cannot sue his living parent for personal injuries by reason of
an unintentional tort,25 the court proceeded to apply the Missouri survi-
val statute. By doing so, in fact, the court recognized that the child ac-
quired a cause of action against his parent based on mere negligence, be-
cause unless there was a cause of action in existence at the time the injury
was inflicted, none could survive the death of the parent! The court em-
phasized that immunity from suit is merely a procedural disability which
does not extend to the administrator, and that the rationale of the rule,
namely, to promote domestic peace, is extinguished for the reason that the
death of the parent ends the family relationship.26
D. Ordinary Negligence in "Extra-parental"
or Business A ctivities
While most courts still adhere to the doctrine of strict immunity in
cases of injuries caused by the parent's ordinary negligence, there is a
growing tendency to look for additional facts which permit the court to
disregard the parent-child situation and view the case in the light of a
general legal relationship. In Dunlap v. Dunlap27 the court found a mas-
ter-servant relation which gave rise to a claim by the servant-son against
the employer-father for injuries suffered in the course of the employ-
ment. The Washington Supreme Court in Borst v. Borst28 went even fur-
ther by granting recovery to a young child who was hit by a truck op-
erated by his father; the court did not require a distinct extra-parental
legal relationship, but considered it sufficient that the tort was committed
by the parent while dealing with the child in a non-parental transaction.
Public policy, in the opinion of the court, demands only that parents be
given immunity from suits for torts committed "while in the discharge
of parental duties." 29 Similarly, in the Ohio case of Signs v. Signs,30 where
the child was burnt when a pump exploded while he was playing near his
father's gas station, the court denied the protection of immunity to the
parent whose negligent business activity caused the injury.
The cases which have thus far been considered are representative of the
trend towards limiting the application of the parental immunity doctrine
to activities growing out of the normal intra-family relation. When the in-
jury occurs under circumstances where the parent-child relation is merely
incidental, there would seem to be no reason in law or justice to deny
-, Id. at 70.
26 The same reasoning is found in Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
2784 N.H. 352, 150 AtI. 905 (1930).
2841 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P. 2d 149 (1952).
29 Id. at 657, 251 P. 2d at 156.
30 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E. 2d 743 (1952).
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redress to a child while granting it to a stranger. This thought leads to the
consideration of the one single factor which gives significance to the cases
here discussed-i.e., the existence of liability insurance.
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE IMMUNITY RULE
Most courts which permit a child to sue his parent and recover a judg-
ment, assert that the presence of liability insurance had no bearing upon
their decision.31 It is for this reason that no mention of this point has been
made thus far in this discussion, although the cases are "pregnant with
liability insurance," 32 and warrant a closer analysis in that regard. It ap-
pears that the courts which granted redress to the child were motivated
by the presence of insurance, but felt obliged to disregard this fact in
their official opinion on the ground that insurance is irrelevant on the is-
sue of liability. On the other hand, these courts made every effort to
discover a special-more or less artificial-reason which takes the case out
of the realm of normal parent-child relationships, in order to permit re-
covery. But when courts are unwilling to relax the immunity rule,
they are, usually "unable to find" any special circumstances, such as wil-
ful and wanton misconduct of the parent, which would justify a limita-
tion of immunity; and in the decisions of these courts the assertion is
again found that the presence of liability insurance is irrelevant and has
no effect upon the immunity of the parent.88 The dominant reason:usu-
ally relied upon is that insurance does not create liability, but only recom-
penses it, where it otherwise exists.3 4
This argument, however, confuses immunity from suit 35 with lack of
responsibility. It overlooks the fact that a wrong was committed which
by ordinary tort law would make the wrongdoer liable to the injured.
The immunity, being merely a procedural disability, is at best a personal
privilege, but does not wipe out the fact that a duty was violated which
caused damage to the child's personal integrity. Even the case which first
promulgated the immunity rule declared that there was actual damage "in
time lost during confinement in the asylum and to this should have been
added damages for mental pain and suffering. . . Surely these injuries
were real ones and compensation for these would be an award for actual
3 1 E.g., Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E. 2d 743 (1952); Borst v. Borst, 41
Vash. 2d 642, 251 P. 2d 149 (1952).
32 Brennccke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W. 2d 68, 76 (Mo. 1960) (dissenting opinion).
33 Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A. 2d 65 (1957).
34 Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark.
832, 114 S.W. 2d 468 (1938).
35 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 678.
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damage." 38 However, because "no such action as this can be maintained, 37
the court denied the unemancipated child the right to come into court
and assert his claim. In other words, the child is considered to have a cause
of action which is unenforceable by reason of public policy. The ques-
tion, therefore, is not whether insurance can create liability where none
existed before, but whether it may affect the parent's suability where a
tort was in fact committed.
The existence of liability insurance is peculiarly interwoven into the
problem under discussion. If the child be permitted to enforce his just
claim38 and recover a judgment against the parent, the family harmony
which was disturbed by the latter's tortious act will-at least to some ex-
tent-be restored by the enhancement of the family's resources.39 And
yet courts which are willing to impose limitations on the immunity doc-
trine in special situations, as previously discussed, refuse to consider the
factor of existing liability insurance, which factor removes the principal
reason propounded for the application of the rule. Family tranquility is
assured, rather than endangered, by a successful action and by a judgment
recovered by the child against the parent! 40 The reluctance of the courts
to admit evidence of insurance coverage as being irrelevant on the issue
of negligence, 41 might be justified where the only reason for the intro-
duction of such evidence is an improper attempt to influence the jury.
But the fact of insurance may be relevant upon some other issue, which in
the cases under discussion, is the issue of suability of the defendant where
the commission of a wrongful act is not disputed. Non-recognition of
this peculiar situation has led the courts to deny recovery, with the result
that the rule of immunity which was created to protect the family rela-
tionship has become completely deprived of its original substance and has
become instead a protection for the insurer. 42 This "conspiracy of silence
about insurance" 43 led the courts to find other distinguishing facts in or-
36 Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 704, 9 So. 885, 886 (1891).
•7 Ibid.
38 The danger of collusion will be considered below. The instant discussion is predi-
cated upon a bona fide claim by the child.
39 Lusk v. Lusk, 113 XV.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). In the Lusk case the court stated:
"This action is not unfriendly as between the daughter and her father. A recovery by
her is no loss to him. In fact, their interests unite in favor of her recovery .... " Id. at 19,
166 S.E. at 539.
40 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E. 2d 743 (1952).
41 MCCORMICK, EvIDENcE, 355 (1954).
42 For a similar analysis see Note, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 171 (1960).
43 McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 41, at 356. Even outside the field of child-parent
actions the doctrine of non-disclosure of insurance has undergone considerable limita-
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der to arrive at the desired result of non-applicability of parental immu-
nity. So, for example, in the Signs case, 44 the Ohio court refused to ap-
ply the immunity rule in view of the changed conditions of our time,
citing especially the "advent of the motor vehicle and the growing com-
plications of business and industry."'45 The court emphasized that the
child was injured by the father's business activity, and not by acts con-
nected with the normal parent-child relationship, and that the question of
insurance was irrelevant.
Only in Lusk v. Lusk40 and Dunlap v. Dunlap47 did the courts frankly
state that the existence of liability insurance made the immunity rule in-
applicable. However, they also emphasized the vocational and business re-
lationship of carrier and passenger in the Lusk case, and master and serv-
ant in the Dunlap decision. But if such dual relationship has to be found
in order to justify liability based on an extra-parental activity, is not the
parent who injures his child while driving an automobile s or piloting an
airplane49 acting in a dual capacity just as surely as is a father who hap-
pens to run a gasoline station, as in the Signs case? 50 In any of these in-
stances, the activity is not typically parental in the narrow sense, and in
each of these cases there is inherent a certain risk of injury to third per-
sons. The fact that courts have held 5' that a parent who is driving the
family car is acting within his parental authority would not, it would
seem, affect his dual status as driver and parent.
The efforts of the courts to find liability of the parent based on some
"dual relationship" between parent and child, rather than to admit the
"unmentionable" fact of liability insurance and to examine its effect upon
the immunity rule, have led to more confusion than clarification. A good
example of this is the reasoning in the dissenting opinion of the Missouri
case above noted.5 2 While arguing that the underlying reason for the im-
tions: "When the rule against disclosure of insurance originated doubtless the existence
of such protection for defendants was exceptional and a "hush, hush" policy could be
effective.... But since insurance has become usual rather than exceptional, it seems likely
today that in nearly all cases the jury will ... consciously assume that the defendant is
so protected. The rule against the introduction of evidence of insurance thus becomes
a hollow shell . . . ." (McCoRMicK, op. cit. supra note 41, at 357).
44 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E. 2d 743 (1952).
45 id. at 575, 103 N.E. 2d at 748.
46 113 V. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
47 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
48Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A. 2d 65 (1957).
49 Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P. 2d 302 (1954).
50 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E. 2d 743 (1952).
51 Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W. 2d 29 (1953)
52 Brennecke %,. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W. 2d 68 (Mo. 1960l.
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munity rule is the "protection of the family relationship and interests, so-
cial and economic," Judge Eager depicts the "possible effects of such liti-
gation in a family (disregarding insurance for the moment), the bitterness
engendered . . . the relationships disrupted. ' 3 Since Judge Eager has to
disregard the existence of insurance in this case in order to make his argu-
ment appear valid, it is apparent that such reasoning is merely theoretical
and not applicable to the situation before the judge, where insurance in
fact existed. As a further justification for disallowing the action to the
child Judge Eager contends that abrogation of the immunity rule would
promote too much harmony in the family by fostering collusion to de-
fraud the insurance companies. 4 These two arguments in favor of strict
adherence to the immunity doctrine contradict each other, because they
are based on a desire to foster family peace and at the same time to dis-
courage too close co-operation between the family members. Although it
cannot be denied that the close relationship might lend itself peculiarly to
fraudulent claims, the remedy cannot be found in a misapplication of a
rule of law developed by the courts for a different purpose. The public
policy which gave rise to the immunity rule cannot, without doing vio-
lence to its meaning, be invoked to protect another public interest-i.e.,
that which the community at large has in preventing frauds. The danger
of collusion always exists in injury cases where liability insurance is pres-
ent,55 but that does not seem to justify the courts in closing their doors to
meritorious claims.56 If the insurance companies' interests are to be pro-
tected, other means might be found, such as enactments limiting liability
to wanton and wilful misconduct (as in automobile guest statutes-,), or
provisions for criminal penalties in cases where actual insurance fraud is
proved. The insurance companies might also protect themselves by in-
creased rates which, though undesirable to the general public, will prob-
ably be the natural result of the new-trend cases, whatever reasons the
courts may give to justify recovery.-"
53 Id. at 75. (Emphasis added.)
54 For similar reasoning, see Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A. 2d 65 (1957).
5 PROssER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 677.
56 MCCORMICK, Op. cit. supra note 41, at 358: "The corrective is not a futile effort at
concealment, but an open assumption by the court of its function of explaining to the
jury its duty of deciding according to the facts and the substantive law ..
5T ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 952, §5 9-201 (1959), is an example of such statutes.
58 Thus, in "Extracts from an address by David Green of the Motor Club of America
Insurance Companies, before the Federation of Insurance Counsel in Philadelphia,
August 25, 1960," reference is made to the "distressing picture" involving parentalim-
munity, by pointing to cases which criticize the immunity rule when applied to a father
who carelessly injured his passenger child while driving a fully insured automobile.
The speaker, as reported, continued: "With a change in the complexion of our Supreme
Court, it is readily conceivable that the present minority may well become part of the
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CONCLUSION
Since public policy does not prevent an action by a child against his
parent where property rights are concerned, there appears to be no rea-
sonable basis to close the doors of the courts to a child who has suffered
personal injuries at the hand of the parent. The immunity doctrine ought
to be applied only to activities which are peculiarly parental and grow
out of the domestic relationship, so that suability of the parent will be the
rule and immunity the exception. The fact of existing liability insurance
should be allowed to be pleaded as an additional circumstance bearing
upon the inapplicability of the immunity doctrine. No act of the legisla-
ture is necessary to declare that restrictions imposed upon a parent's lia-
bility are not applicable to facts not envisaged by a court seventy years
ago. The immunity doctrine was created by the courts and it is "espe-
cially for them to interpret and modify that doctrine to correspond with
prevalent considerations of public policy and social needs."59 A look at
other fields of the law shows that the doctrine of immunity from suits in
the area of torts is no longer a favorite of the courts. Immunities which
were granted for many years are undergoing constant limitations without
the help of the legislature. For instance, the Illinois Supreme Court in
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Districto emphasized the basic
concept underlying the whole law of torts, i.e., that liability follows neg-
ligence, and stated:
Ve are not dealing with property law or other fields of the law where stability
and predictability may be of utmost concern. We are dealing with the law
of torts where there can be little, if any, justifiable reliance and where the rule
of stare decisis is admittedly limited. 61
In advocating the need for a forthright re-evaluation of a doctrine
which appears to be not only obsolete but results in injustice and dis-
majority of the Court, which could well change this and many other rules of the com-
mon law on which insurance companies bave relied in issuing their policies." United
States Investor, September 19, 1960, p. 77. (Emphasis added.)
59 Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 111. 2d 608, 619, 131 N.E. 2d 525, 530 (1956).
60 18 fI1. 2d 11, 163 N.E. 2d 89 (1959). In that case the immunity doctrine previously
protecting a quasi-public agency-namely, a school district whose employee had negli-
gently injured a plaintiff-was abolished. Similarly, in Moore v. Moyle, 405 I11. 555, 92
N.E. 2d 81 (1950), the Illinois court deviated from its previously strict adherence to the
doctrine of immunity of charities. Here, the existence of liability insurance, which
directly affected and limited the immuinity, was in fact a necessary part of the allegations
to show that non-trust funds were available for the satisfaction of the judgment.
61 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 18 I11. 2d 11, 26, 163 N.E. 2d 89,
96 (1959),
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turbance of the very peace of families which it is alleged to protect, a
reference to Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition seems in order:
When we find that in large and important branches of the law the various
grounds of policy on which the rules have been justified are later inventions to
account for what are in fact survivals from more primitive times, we have a
right to reconsider the popular reasons and-taking a broader view of the field,
to decide anew whether those reasons are satisfactory.... If truth were not often
suggested by error, if old implements could not be adjusted ... human progress
would be slow. But scrutiny and revision are justified.62
62 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 37 (1945).
SOME ASPECTS OF INTERPRETATION AND APPLICA-
TION OF THE BROKERAGE CLAUSE OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Robinson-Patman Act' was enacted by Congress in 1936 to regu-
late price discrimination in or affecting interstate commerce. The act
amended section 2 of the Clayton Act 2 by enlarging it into six subsec-
tions numbered 2(a), 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), 2(e) and 2(f). These six subsec-
tions embody the core of the federal law on price discrimination. In the
twenty-four years since the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, section
2 (c) 3 of the act has engaged the attention of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and several courts of appeals to a far greater extent than any other
provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act.4 Most of the litigation has taken
place over the problem of interpretation and application of this section.
Though construed by several courts of appeals, the "Brokerage Clause"
(as section 2(c) is popularly known) received for the first time Supreme
Court review in 1960. It is the purpose of the writer to examine the legis-
lative history, the early court decisions, and the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncement in Federal Trade Commission v. Henry Broch & Co.,5 in
order to acquaint the reader with the more important aspects of interpre-
tation and application of section 2(c) today.
1 15 U.S.C.A. S 13 (Supp. 1959).
238 Stat. 730 (1914).
3 15 U.S.C.A. S 13(c) (Supp. 1959).
4 Statistics on the number of violations of each section of the Robinson-Patman Act
from 1936 to 1957 show that forty-seven per cent of the cease and desist orders (145 out
of 311) were issued by the Federal Trade Commission in brokerage cases. See generally
EDWARDS, THE PJUcE DISCRIMINATIoN LAW 68-72 (1959).
' 363 U.S. 166, rehearing denied, 29 U.S. L. WEEK 3104 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1960) (No. 61).
